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two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the 
nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens 
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Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper is not addressed to game theorists -- unless they are interested
to learn something about  how  their products are  being  used. The paper is
addressed, instead, to those economists who make use of game theory notions
in the process of analyzing and advising on climate change negotiations.
In 1995 one of us presented  a  paper2  entitled “Cooperation  vs.  Free
Riding in International Affairs: Two Approaches” where the main question
was: can a grand — worldwide — coalition prevail in climate decisions, or is the
problem of such a logical structure that treaties involving only small groups of
countries will ever be signed? The answer was in the form of an advocacy of
the former thesis.
After 10years, that debate is, to say the least, not closed. Is the present
exercise then just a remake? Or has progress been made ? While receiving and
selecting papers for this conference, we  felt that  yes,  there  is progress,  but
further clarifications are still called for, let alone for ourselves. This motivates
our present contribution, whose structure is clear enough from its title.
Let us introduce some notation for easier reference below. With N the set
of all countries of the world, indexed i = 1,…,n, let pi denote the amount (flow3)
of pollutant emissions in country i, let the value of the increasing function (with
an upper bound) gi(pi), denote the level of country i’s GDP, and let the function
πi (.) measure the total cost of damages caused in country i by the aggregate
emissions Σ pi.
In this setting, we shall call a “treaty” a joint choice by several countries of
an abatement policy, that is, a level of pi for each of them, as well as of possible
transfers of resources among them. It is also, in general equilibrium terms, a
                                                 
2 Published thereafter as TULKENS 1998.
3 The specific problems raised by stock externalities  will  not be considered in this  discussion,
although  such  are  indeed  the  externalities  generated  by  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Our
immediate excuse is that  they  are not dealt  with  either  in the  literature  we consider. More
fundamentally, we think the issues at stake  need to be clarified  first  within  flow (static)
models before being tackled in the dynamic context required by stock externalities.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 4
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state — or an “allocation” — of  the  simple international economy  specified
above.
In the absence of treaty, we assume that each country chooses the policy
that suits it best, given the policies of the other countries, this resulting in a state
of  the  international  economy  which  is  also  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  the
noncooperative game that can be associated with the above elements.
Efficiency for a group of countries, be it N or any subset S of it, is a joint
policy of the members  of  the  group  that  maximizes the  group’s aggregate
welfare W. In the case of N, this objective reads
WN  =  ΣΝ [ gi(pi) — πi (ΣΝpj)]
where all summation signs refer to indexes running from 1 to n. If the group is
a subset S of N however, the maximand is denoted WS with the first summation
in the above expression including only the members of S, whereas the second
one  still  bears  on  all  i’s.  This  difference  characteristically makes  the  IEA
problem one of externalities.
2.  COOPERATION
On the theme of cooperation concerning IEAs, we may distinguish two
views. One is economic theoretic, the other is game theoretic.
2.1  The economic rationale for cooperation
The economic view finds its justification in the public good or diffuse
characteristic of the externality generated by the emissions that cause climate
change.   Because the public good is global, that  is, world wide, elementary
public goods theory (SAMUELSON 1954) teaches  us  that  efficiency (in  the
Pareto sense) can be reached only if all concerned parties are involved in the
process of resource allocation required to master the externality in question.
Thus, getting all parties involved —  be  it by  sharing cost, or  by  revealing
preferences, or both, or still by other means — is an essential requirement for
efficiency. Economically, the social objective of efficiency entails the necessity ofCooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 5
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cooperation. Samuelson saw only the  State as  an  appropriate actor  for  this
purpose.
Independently of the public good characteristic just highlighted for  the
diffuse externalities here under discussion, another economic argument  for
cooperation  in  the  sense  of  engaging  in  bargaining  in  the  presence  of
externalities  is  provided  by  the  Coase  theorem.  IEAs  may  be  viewed  as
outcomes  of  voluntary  negotiations  between  generators  and  recipients  of
externalities, as described by COASE 1961. This view concludes at an efficient
outcome (under appropriate conditions). The Coasean view does not involve
the State: quite to the contrary, it asserts that the efficient outcome will emerge
from spontaneous negotiations between the parties involved.
2.2  Cooperative games
The  game  theoretic  perspective  is  the  one  offered  by  the  theory  of
cooperative games. This theory flourished in the  60s  and  70s  prominently
within the Jerusalem school of game theory and produced a wealth of “solution
concepts” meant to describe the outcome of games  (social interactions, in a
more recent and better adapted vocabulary) when coalitions of players are the
object of analysis. These developments occurred quite independently of public
goods and externality theory.
It happens to be difficult, though, to find in this literature  arguments
explaining and justifying the  phenomenon  of  cooperation.  Section  8.1  of
MYERSON’s 1991 book is entitled “Noncooperative foundations of cooperative
game theory” should provide an answer to this query, but the author cautions
the reader on how “subtle” the concept is. The attractive idea of giving  a
noncooperative foundation to cooperative game theory (the “Nash program”)
hits at a basic difficulty: the multiplicity of equilibria of  the    noncooperative
games that might support cooperative solutions concepts. Criteria  that  are
discussed at length for explaining how selection from among these equilibria
might logically occur (focal arbitration of Schelling, institutions, contracts).
Somehow, these criteria are one  way  or  another  inspired by  the  notion  of
efficiency: cooperation finds its raison d’être in the efficiency it allows to achieve.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 6
ParkashChander and Henry Tulkens -- July 2005
It can be given its root in the outcome of some process of bargaining among
the cooperating players4.
These arguments hardly explain, however,  how groups  are  formed,  as
admitted by the author. At any rate, all game theory textbooks,  when  they
come to their cooperative games chapters (if any),  consider that  the  theory
bears on formed groups taken as given, without enquiring on how they got
formed, and to which the joint objective of striving for efficiency within the
group is attributed .
2.3 Games with externalities
Turning to cooperative games for analyzing IEAs is nevertheless quite
justified.  The  theory  has  indeed  provided  very  compelling  arguments  in
support of competitive market exchanges, arguments pointing to the so-called
strategic stability of market equilibria  because  they  belong  to  the  core  of
cooperative games associated with markets.
It is thus quite natural to ask whether the core concept, if applied to
international economies with externalities, can offer similar  properties  for
Coasean agreements between generators and recipients. This question  was
raised in the early 70s but it was not clearly dealt with all along the 70sand 80s,
probably  due  to  imprecise,  unrealistic,  or  ad  hoc representations  of  the
externality  phenomenon  itself.  Typically,  the  core  theory  was  oscillating
between results of non existence and problems  of  non  convexities, and the
cooperative games under consideration were in fact not really bearing on the
multilateral and diffuse form that is commonly used nowadays and recalled in
the above introduction.
In the early 90s, clarification on the externality formulation front allowed
for the game theoretic apparatus to be called upon and its solution concepts to
be applied in this field. The core  was one  of  these  concepts so  adapted by
CHANDER and TULKENS 1995 and 1997, under the name of “γ-core “. Thus,
                                                 
4 Pushing this view one step farther, some authors consider cooperative games as normative
social  science,  as  opposed  to  noncooperative  games  being  positive  science.  This  is  an
oversimplification.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 7
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one  major concept  of  cooperative  game  theory  was  imported  in  the  IEA
literature. One may wonder why, and regret that, other such concepts from the
Jerusalem  school  alluded  to  above  — the  bargaining  set,  the  kernel,  the
nucleolus, the Shapley value or the von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets —
have not been similarly more explored in the externalities context5.
2.4  Coalition formation
At the beginning of the 90s however, there  appeared in the  early  IEA
literature of CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993, 1995 as well as BARRETT 1994
arguments on formation of coalitions of countries, inspired from earlier cartel
formation models,  that  some  of  authors  later  on  called a  noncooperative
approach.
This theory is built around the idea that a group (coalition) S forms or
does not form depending upon whether it passes the following test, called of
internal and external stability :
S is internally stable if  
€ 
∀i ∈ S, WS
i >W i { }
i
and
S is externally stable if  
€ 
∀i ∉ S, W i { }
i > WS
i .
(This  is  reminiscent  of  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  “stable  sets”,  as
expounded by OSBORNE and RUBINSTEIN 1994, p. 279, but is not  identical
however).
The 1995 paper mentioned above had several questions and remarks on
the consistency of the developments made from this definition, especially on
the point that it was not specified what happened with the other players.
This seems to have been corrected  recently  by  some  authors  having
recourse to the notion of games in partition function form. With this tool, the all
                                                 
5 A notable recent exception is  to be found in the  work of VAN  STEENBERGHE  2004 who
deals  with  the  nucleolus  and  the  Shapley  value  of  our  externality  game,  using  the  γ-
characteristic function that allowed to define the core.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 8
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players set, N, is split into non overlapping and collectively exhaustive subsets,
which define what is called a coalition structure: each partition is such a structure.
To each element of a coalition structure, that is, to each coalition belonging to
the structure, one can apply the above internal-external (I-E) stability test. If for
a given structure the test is passed  by  all its  coalitions, one  may  call the
structure I-E stable. Other expressions are “multi-coalitional equilibrium”, or
still a “fragmented equilibrium”.
This is definitely an improvement in the specification of what happens in
the rest of the economy when the I-E stability test is put to  any  individual.
Existence proof of such equilibrium structures for the standard IEA model have
not been provided yet, to the best of our knowledge.
However,  EYCKMANS  and  FINUS  2005  have  explored  the  issue  by
means of numerical simulations with the specific CWS integrated assessment
model6. They take all conceivable partitions of  the  set  of  six regions  of  the
world that the model treats as “countries”, they compute a  multi-coalitional
equilibrium  for  each  structure  (that  is,  a  Nash  equilibrium  between  the
coalitions in the structure) and then they check which ones of these coalitions
pass the I-E stability test. Similarly, BUCHNER and CARRARO 2005 examine
with simulations on the FEEM-RICE model7 the I-E stability of conceivable
coalition structures.
In a multi coalitional equilibrium, each coalition S is assumed to achieve
efficiency within itself along its members. While each coalition thus strives for
internal efficiency, one could ask why is this quest limited to the members of S?
Why  do  coalitions not  strive  for  external  efficiency, that  is,  contact  other
coalitions and adopt mutually beneficial and still more efficient strategies?
If it can be shown that the resulting merged coalition is not I-E stable, then
the above argument applies for asserting that the merge will not takeplace. But
if it happened to be I-E stable, then why should the merged coalition not form?
We would have multiple equilibria, though. Any argument  that  would give
precedence to the equilibrium with the merge over the one without it would be
                                                
6 The CWS model was introduced by EYCKMANS and TULKENS 2003.
7 The FEEM-RICE model was introduced in BUONANNO, CARRARO and GALEOTTI, 2003.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 9
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based on efficiency domination of the former.  So,  we  are  driven back  to  a
reasoning on coalition formation essentially led by efficiency considerations8.
Finally, it is probably clear that, no more than what cooperative game
theory has to offer, I-E stability criteria do not teach much on the process of
how stable coalitions are formed.
2.5  An axiomatic approach
On the theme of coalition formation in games with externalities, MASKIN
2003  has  brought  about  a  contribution  based  on  other  arguments.  He
(courageously) tackled the sequential process of discussions between players
on whether or not they will act jointly. His analysis is grounded in an explicit
axiomatics that bears (in part) on communication between the players. One of
these axioms specifies that  at  some  point  any  player  is  allowed to  break
communication lines between himself and (some of) the other players. On that
basis, the conclusion is derived that the grand coalition will not form.
But  doesn’t  that  axiom  contain  the  conclusion?  Leaving  aside  this
objection, it is to be praised that Maskin introduces the  important factor of
communication  between  the  players  as  a  determinant  of  cooperation.  He
acknowledges9, however, that without this axiom, the grand coalition would
form  in  the  public  good  game  of  his  paper  (which  is  very  close  to  the
environmental model we deal with in IEA literature), and thus efficiency would
prevail.
*          *          *
To summarize on the complementary themes of cooperation and coalition
formation, we are left with the following: (1) the Nash program, which  is
incomplete; (2) the I-E stability argument that only explains the non formation
of  some  coalitions  (among  which  N);  (3)  the  communication  breakdown
argument axiomatically called upon by Maskin to justify the non formation of
                                                 
8 Repeating this reasoning on further mergers might well end up with N as the only coalition!
9 Private communication, after the Coalition Theory Network meeting in Paris,  January 2005,
where the paper was presented and discussed.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 10
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the grand coalition in games with externalities. Conceptual progress is there.
General results are scarce, however.
3.  STABILITY
Stability may be viewed from a positive point of view or, alternatively,
from a normative viewpoint. The positive view considers stability as a logical
property of some situations, whereas in the normative perspective, stability is
taken as a desirable virtue, that is, something to be sought after.
The coalition formation  literature, whose  recent  development was just
evoked, belongs to the positive view.
A point to be clarified at the outset is the following: stability of what? Of
coalitions or of allocations? In many of its formulations in the IEA literature the
focus has been more on coalitions than on allocations. This is due, we surmise,
to the systematic use of the symmetric players assumption10 by the authors,
which leads them to state their results in terms of a single number, namely the
number of signatories, with no mention whatsoever of the ensuing state of the
economy or of the environment. The oversimplification of the economic model
has made one loose the object of interest. When it comes to derive policy (i.e.
normative) statements it is not sure that such a slender basis provides a strong
enough justification.
3.1  Alternative stability concepts: internal-external stability   vs coalitional
stability.
This being said, the main issue is: what kind of stability is at  stake?  In
slightly more sophisticated terms,  which concept of  stability is being  used?
Internal-external stability which inspired the coalition formation literature is not
the only stability notion offered by game theory; it is even a rather recent one.
The expression of “strategic stability” has been known for decades to designate
some of the solutions proposed by cooperative game theory.
                                                
10 As well as the rudimentary description of environmental phenomena; but this  is acceptable
because no model will ever describe reality entirely.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 11
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3.2  Some further insights on the nature of γ-core solutions for the IEA game
Let us recall that for  an  IEA  game,  the  γ-core  consists of  allocations
(treaties11) that specify:
 (i)  a profile of emissions for each party, that are Pareto efficient at the world
level;
(ii) transfers (some positive, some negative) amongst the parties12, that cover
the total cost of abatement for each of them, and are financed by contributions
from each based on their relative (marginal) environmental damage costs13.
The core property of an allocation is that if any individual or group of
parties considers deviating from it, the best it can do is less attractive than what
it gets in the allocation.
As we are dealing with a game with externalities, it is essential to be clear
on one point: when an individual or a group of parties considers deviating,
what should they think the other parties will do: punish them (for instance by
polluting a lot), or let them go (and possibly adjusting their abatement policy to
the absence of the defector)? From the alternative assumptions that may be
made in this respect, the γ-core theory is based on assuming that in the case of
defection by some subset S of parties, the other parties will abandon any form
of cooperation and act to the best of their interest as singletons in the face of S.
                                                
11 Incidentally, there is no  a  priori  reason to believe  that  there  is  only one allocation  (or
treaty) that could belong to the core of the  IEA game. In other words, the  core is not a unique
point solution concept, neither in general no in the particular case of IEAs.
12 It  is  important  always  to  recall  (from CHANDER,  TULKENS,  VAN  YPERSELE  and
WILLEMS 2003, section 5) that the same allocation  can be achieved  with  the  transfers being
substituted by initial allowances of tradable emission permits, provided that  the  amounts of
these allowances be such that the resulting competitive equilibrium  on the  permits market
induces the γ-core allocation just defined. This point is of major importance when discussing
the connection between the theories presently examined  and  actual  treaties,  such as  the
Kyoto Protocol for instance, where there are no explicit transfers specified. But the treaty’s
allowances play their role. For a further and thorough exploration  of this  substitution, see
VAN STEENBERGHE 2004.
13 In the notation of this paper, the CHANDER-TULKENS 1997 formula for these transfers Ti
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The outcome of this joint strategy being dubbed a “partial agreement  Nash
equilibrium with respect to S (PANE w.r.t. S).
When this form of cooperative game with externalities was presented, so
much of the discussion was focused on this assumption that many people have
lost  sight  of  what  the  core  allocation  itself  is.  Therefore,  we  seize  this
opportunity to present, with the help of some diagrams,  some  apparently
unnoticed properties of the solution we advocate.
In the standard multilateral externality model everybody uses nowadays
to deal with IEAs, each player (country) i is at the same time a polluter and a
pollutee14.  In  an  effort  to  disentangle which roles  each  one  of  these  two
functions plays in the determination of the solution, let us consider successively
the following elementary, actually unilateral, forms of the model, successively
with two, and then three parties.
In the first instance, we have just one polluting country, indexed r, which
is not polluted,  and one polluted country indexed e, which is not a polluter.
Think of a simple upstream-downstream  river  pollution  situation.  In  the
Edgeworth box -  type  of  diagram  appearing in  Figure  1,  that  one  of  us
introduced in 197415, the core of this two agents economy consists of all points
on the segment A-B; it is also the locus of all allocations that may be reached by
Coasean bargaining. Among these points, the Chander-Tulkens (CT) solution is
seen in this case to be point A. Indeed, it is formulated as (i) a Pareto optimum;
and (ii) with a transfer KL such that the polluter is compensated by the pollutee
for his abatement cost, and nothing more. The segment A-B is reminiscent of
the gains from trade in exchange interpretations of the Edgeworth box. The
figure here illustrates vividly how the externality is somehow an object of
exchange in this setting.
Let us now enlarge this economy with one more  pollutee, with the two
pollutees indexed e1 and e2 respectively. Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1 except
that the second pollutee’s indifference curve has been added horizontally to the
                                                
14 This is why it is called multilateral.
15 See TULKENS and SCHOUMAKER 1975, pp. 247 ff., probably independently redrawn in
VARIAN 1990, pp. 539 and 542. This diagram can be deduced from the  simplified  version of
the IEA model sketched out below the figure. Full details are given in the paper cited.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 13
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first pollutee’s curve, so that at each point on the resulting curve MD the slope
of the tangent measures the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between
environmental pollution and the numeraire y.
Here, the Pareto efficient level of emission p* is measured as OrC, the core
of the economy is the line DE and the CT solution is the core point D. At that
allocation, the polluter is compensated just for the cost of his abatement, and no
more. The bargaining gain (DE) is entirely appropriated by the pollutees as if,
in process, they had acted as a single party16.
What this illustration makes clear is threefold:
(i) it shows what the bargaining gain is made of with several pollutees, that is,
with several recipients of the externality;
(ii) it identifies this gain with the core of the game;
(iii) it shows the particular nature of the CT solution within the core: it deprives
the polluter of any pure bargaining gain; but all of  his abatement  cost is
covered.
Note  that  other  core  points  are  conceivable  and  reachable,  all  more
beneficial to  the  polluter. If  they  were  reached,  it  would  be  out  of  pure
bargaining power between r and the set of e’s; free riding on  the  part of  r
would play no role in this respect, for the simple reason that for r, there  is
nothing to free-ride about!
The relative positions of the players qua polluters vs. qua  pollutees in the
IEA game, in its core and at the CT solution are  further  highlighted with
diagrams such as those appearing in Figures 3 and 4. They show how large the
γ-core can be as well as the strongly pollutees-favoring character of  the  CT
solution. All the ecological surplus goes to them. Yet, this is specific to the CT
solution: other solutions in the core may benefit the polluters, as suggested by
point R on Figure 4 where the two polluters succeed  to  reap  part  of  the
bargaining gain (they would reap it all if R was located on the c-d line).
                                                
16 Unfortunately, the picture does not lend itself  to show easily  how, at the  CT solution, the
coverage of the polluter’s abatement cost KL is shared between the two pollutees e1 and e2,
and thus how the Coasean gain is shared amongst them.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 14
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3.3  The rationale for a game with a particular coalition structure
In  extending  the  core  concept  to  games  of  the  IEA  type,  the  key
instrument is an appropriate specification of the characteristic function of the
game. This function summarizes the ability of groups of players to object to, to
block or to improve upon possible solutions (or, for that matter, to free ride on
a solution). With externalities taking place between individual players as well as
between groups, an essential element is that the value of function for a given
group also depends on the actions of players not in the group.
The assumption made in this respect when formulating the γ-characteristic
function  in  terms  of  PANE  w.r.t.Ses  (specifying  for  each  S that  all  non-
members of S act as singletons) amounts to define the function on a particular
partition of the set N. As already mentioned above, a particular partition of the
set of players has been called17 a coalition structure. We are thus dealing with a
cooperative game with a coalition structure.
The question may be raised why limiting oneself to just that structure and
not considering the family of all conceivable partitions that may contain S ?
This would transform our IEA game, which thus far  is one  in characteristic
function form, into a game in partition function form.
We have two reasons for not exploring this extension. One is the paucity
of results, and even of treatment, of such games in the  literature18,  that  we
could transpose to our IEA model. The other reason is one of substance: Not all
coalition structures can be considered as rational ones, and equally likely to
emerge. Some coalition structures are of little or no interest, such as 
€ 
N \ i { }; i { } [ ]
for instance, when i is an unimportant country, both as emitter and as recipient
of the externality. Also, the structure 
€ 
i { };N \ i { } [ ], which is the one of optimistic
individual free riding, is irrational for 
€ 
N \ i { } as we shall argue below19 in 3.4.2.
                                                
17 By AUMANN and DRÈZE 1974.
18 THRALL and LUCAS 1963 is an early source, limited to n ≤ 3.
19 These arguments  also apply,  and even more forcefully, to more asymmetric models where
some players are either polluters only or pollutees only.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 15
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Thus,  instead  of  considering  mechanically  all  conceivable  structures,
taking  into  account  the  rationality  of  the  collective  behavior  of  the  non-
members of S leads one to rather select a well justified structure.
3.4  Free riding and stability
3.4.1  Two forms of free riding
Originally, the expression of free riding was used by SAMUELSON 1954 to
describe the behavior of economic agents who conceal their preferences with
respect to a public good20 vis-à-vis a single producer — this producer being
necessarily the State because of the impossibility of selling the good. On the
public good production side, there  was  no  question  of  leaving  or  joining
coalitions, neither in that paper, nor in the following public goods literature —
until the international environmental problems were taken up in the late sixties
and early seventies.
Here, the necessarily voluntary character of the provision of the public
good, that is, abatement of the environmental externality, together with the
fact that the externality is multilateral, shifted the attention from the issue of
individual consumers revealing preferences to  a  planning authority21  to  the
problem of having several States participate or not in international voluntary
agreements on a global externality. The expression of free riding reappeared
here not as a preference revelation problem but instead as a way to behave in
the face of such agreements22.
                                                
20 Correct revelation is necessary to be able to check whether  efficiency  is  obtained;  but if
that information is used to determine the individuals’ contributions to the  financing of the
public good, they will be tempted to understate their preferences  and  production will  be
suboptimal, whereas if no connection  is made between what they reveal and what  they  have
to pay, they will overstate their preferences and production will be larger than optimal.
21 While Samuelson himself in 1954 wrote that only some smart game theorist could master
the preference revelation problem raised by the  free riding behavior  he had  identified,  the
challenge was successfully taken up by game theoretically minded economists fifteen  years
later in a series of papers written in the context of decentralized planning procedures, starting
with DREZE and DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN  1971, pursued by ROBERTS 1979, HENRY 1979,
GROVES and LEDYARD 1973, TIDEMAN 1974, and culminating with  CHAMPSAUR   and
LAROQUE 1981. This literature may  be seen as one of the  main sources of the  mechanism
design stream of thought that developed subsequently.
22 A third notion of free riding has been put forward by FINUS 2001 (p. …), namely  the
behavior that consists in signing an agreement and then not complying with it.   We  are  not
sure this wording is appropriate. Non compliance is breaching  an  agreement  that  wasCooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 16
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There  are  thus  two  forms  of  free  riding,  that  we  propose  to  call
“preference revelation (PR) free riding” and “non participatory (NP)  free
riding”, respectively. Notice that the two forms are not mutually exclusive, but
we  are  not  aware  of  any  work  that  treats  them  simultaneously. We  shall
consider here essentially the latter, with occasional allusions to the former.
3.4.2 Free riding and I-E vs. γ-core stability
Free riding is a special form of instability of a group. Depending upon the
stability concept one uses, what free riding designates will vary. Thus, if a core
allocation is declared not to be I-E stable, that is, lets some i leave the grand
coalition, it is because the non stability  statement  implicitly rests  on  the
assumption  that  if  i leaves  N, N\{i} remains  as  a  coalition,  possibly  re-
optimizing its strategy, and tolerates i’s free riding, that is, it tolerates the global
inefficiency induced by i’s defection. Now, this my be rational on the part of
N\{i}  only if the role of {i} in the economic problem is small. But it is irrational
whenever that role is important, either because i has a lot to abate [(p*—p¯) is
large], or i is an important contributor to cost coverage (πi is large), or a fortiori
when both factors are at play: the severe efficiency loss in these three cases is
such that it is more  rational for the members  of N\{i}  to threaten to break
apart into singletons, which would drive i back to the Nash equilibrium and
thereby induce him not to defect in the first place23.
Thus, the assumption behind internal-external stability of an (efficient)
coalition N is that N\{i} tolerates free riding24 and even adjusts to it.  By contrast,
the assumption behind the γ-core  stability is that N\{i} counters free riding by
reacting,  not  in  an  extreme  punishing  way  (as  with  the  α-characteristic
function) but rather in a way just sufficient for making the free rider  realize
that he might be put in a situation in which he would definitely prefer what he
gets with the grand coalition after all.
                                                                                                                                              
adhered to. In the two senses described above, free riding is either  not signing the  agreement,
or being part of it under favourable conditions because of an information bias.
23 This farsightedness argument was first introduced in CHANDER 2003.
24 EYCKMANS and FINUS 2004 do even reward it, calling it “ideal”. Note that  to offer that
compensation, it is needed to now the  preferences of the  free  rider.  Is there  any reason to
believe that he will reveal truthfully, while bargaining on a possible defection?Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 17
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The strength of the γ-core concept in dealing with (actually, solving) the
free rider problem thus lies in the farsighted rationality of the threat it assumes.
The weakness of I-E stability is, instead, in that it legimates free riding.
3.4.3 Free riding and the particular CT core solution.
While the CT solution has all the core stability properties just outlined, in
addition it allows one to see the effect of a party i joining but  incorrectly







  coefficients  in  the  transfers
formula. Understating πI implies a lesser contribution of i to the coverage of the
aggregate abatement cost. But that lower value of πi also induces a less than
optimal level of aggregate abatement since the optimality criterion is based on
the sum of the πi’s. Thus, the CT solution to the IEA game is vulnerable to
preference revelation free riding, at least away from the optimum25.
To conclude, we are back again to the motivations for seeking stability:
from  a  normative  point  of  view,  the  reason  for  avoiding  free  riding  is
essentially that it prevents efficiency.
4. SELF-ENFORCEMENT 
“Self-enforcement” is an intuitively quite  attractive  expression,  when
dealing with international agreements. It evokes  the  absence of  an  external
authority, which  is  at  the  root  of  the  problems  raised  by  this  type  of
agreements.  It  also  contains  an  implicit reference  to  incentives.  After  its
introduction by BARRETT 1994, the  appearance of  a  book  (BARRETT 2003)
entirely devoted to that idea has positioned the author as its most articulate
advocate.
                                                
25 When the optimum is reached, there is an argument due to DRÈZE and DE LA VALLEE
POUSSIN  1971  (section  3)  establishing  that  it  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  preference
revelation  game  that  all  parties  to  reveal  correctly  their  preferences.  Away  from  the
optimum, this is not the case anymore, but the bias in misrepresentation can be identified  (see
ROBERTS 1979).Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 18
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For cooperative game-minded theorists like us, there is a bit of mystery
with it: it is difficult to find in the  standard literature a  commonly  received
definition of self-enforcement. It does usually not appear in the index of game
theory textbooks, and when it does (e.g. in MYERSON 1991), it is only to refer
to a property of occasional interest. More importantly, in what sense is self-
enforcement more than efficiency, or more than core or I-E stability? Is it an
additional concept that we should add to our tool box for IEA analysis?
We feel that while the answer to the last question is definitely yes, the
answers to the previous question are difficult to make precise.
Self-enforcement is  a  property  of  a  treaty  that  “must  satisfy  three
conditions: individual rationality, collective rationality and fairness” (BARRETT
2003, pp. xiii-xiv). Apart from the first one, which is used in its standard sense,
these terms are given a special meaning. For  instance, collective rationality is
redefined successively in chapters 7 and 11 as a property of a treaty implying
not only efficiency for the group under consideration, but in addition  free
riding deterrence (p. 213)26, which is given on p.294 two possible forms (strong
and weak collective rationality, respectively). A formal definition is offered in
section 11.4, unfortunately with a model of identical players which is hardly
convincing.  On  the  other  hand,  fairness  is  not  formally  dealt  with,  but
presented as a requirement that  the  treaty  “be  perceived by  the  parties as
being legitimate” (p.xiv).
While  potential  readers,  fond  of  precise  definitions  and  rigorous
developments  of  sufficiently  rich  and  realistic  models,  are  likely  to  be
sometimes disappointed, the book offers nevertheless a remarkable intellectual
challenge to theorists dealing with IEAs.
The one we like to highlight here is the theme  of  chapter  11,  which
describes a possible trade-off between the breadth of international cooperation
(in terms of the number participants in a treaty) and its depth (in terms of the
                                                 
26 We have responded above to Barrett’s criticism of the  γ-core  whereby he  introduces his
collective rationality concept: we claim that the threat he considers as non credible is in fact
a farsighted rational one, as proved in CHANDER 2003.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 19
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size of the actions agreed upon by the parties): is a “broad but shallow” treaty
better than a “narrow but deep” one?
A shallow treaty would be one that does not achieve full efficiency among
the participating countries, e.g. by abating less than optimal; this would be the
price, so to speak, for having it signed by  many  countries. The outcome  is
called by Barrett a “consensus treaty”, asserted elsewhere to be self-enforcing.
That this is better  than  the  opposite  (deep  and  narrow)  is  claimed to  be
established (p.302) by means of an ingenious symmetric countries model. But
we have already voiced the opinion that such a basis is itself quite shallow for
transforming into scientific truth this conjecture.
Yet,  the  trade-off  brought  to  light  remains  an  important  intellectual
challenge: while it surely deserves scrutiny by means of better adapted, and
therefore more elaborate game  theoretic tools, it illustrates once  more  that
before proving an idea to be true, it must be generated. This is a major merit of
many ideas in Scott Barrett’s book.
Let  me  conclude  with  a  perhaps  timely  question:  would  the  David
Bradford scheme presented at this conference be self-enforcing?Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 20
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5.  CONCLUSION
Neither stability nor cooperation are desirable per se. Both are there to
achieve efficiency, because  the  welfare  of  people  derives  primarily  from
allocations, not from their stability or from cooperation. The virtues of Barrett’s
self-enforcement  eventually  point  in  the  same  direction,  admitting  that
otherwise, no treaty would be signed at all.
At a less general level, the analysis revealed that there is much to gain in
understanding if one distinguishes more explicitly between the involvement of
countries as polluters from their involvement as pollutees.
In fact, this is already done, to some extent, within the Kyoto Protocol: the
motivations  behind  the  aggregate quotas  that  have  been  negotiated  are
essentially  those  of  the  pollutees:  they  result  from  their  preferences;  by
contrast, the working of flexible mechanisms is of concern essentially for the
polluters. What is less clear is how the bargaining gain turns out to be shared
among these parties.Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 21
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: 
€ 
Polluter: ur(pr,yr), yr ≤ y
r (> 0:initial endowment)
with ∂ur /∂pr ≥ 0, ∂ur /∂yr > 0,
Pollutee: ue(pr,ye), ye ≤ y
e (> 0:initial endowment)
with ∂ue /∂pr < 0, ∂ue /∂ye > 0.
M:    Nash equilibrium
A  -  B:  core (with respect to M)













Figure 1 - A one polluter (r) - one pollutee (e) economy
Source:  TULKENS and SCHOUMAKER 1975Cooperation, Stability and Self-enforcement: A Conceptual Discussion 24
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∗ is optimal because at for that value of    pr
slope at D  (=  MRSr)   =   slope at E  (= MRSei
i
∑ )
M:    Nash equilibrium
D  -  E :  core allocations
D: CT solution  ( r  receives from  e1 and e2 an aggragate  transfer KL; 
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Figure 3 :  The γ core in payoffs space









The game is defined by  N ={r,e1,e2}and the characteristic function  v( .).
                                    Note that  v(e1,e2) = 0.
     The origin is the welfare levels of players at the Nash equilibrium
The  CT solution is one point along the segment  [a, b]. 
                 There, all the bargaining gain accrues to the pollutees.
   
      That point A belongs to the core illustrates that the (single) polluter 
                           can reap all of the bargaining gain
We2
v(r, e2) v(r, e2)
v(r, e2) v(r, e1)
b
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The game is defined by  N ={e, r1, r2}and the characteristic function  v( .).
                                    Note that  v(r1,r2) = 0.
      The origin is the welfare levels of players at the Nash equilibrium
The  CT solution is one point on the We axis. 
There, all the bargaining gain (or ecological surplus) accrues
                             to the (single) pollutee.
   
           Other core solutions give some of the gain to the polluters 
      but in this example, a solution where the two polluters would reap
all of the bargaining gain (i.e.a point along [c,d])does not belong to the core.
In general, the stronger (weaker) the coalitions between the polluter and one pollutee,






Figure 4 :  The γ core in payoffs space
for any one pollutee (e) and two polluters  (r1,r2) gameNOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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